desertdudeshj wrote:In the same vein, majority of the so called 9/11 bombers were Saudi and none were Afghani or Iraqi. Yet the US is best buds with the Saudi's and sell them billions of dollars worth of arms and invaded Afghanistan and Iraq instead.
"So called" 9/11 bombers?? If they weren't 9/11 bombers, then what else would you call them? Or is that to say that you don't believe 9/11 didn't happen?
Yes, they were Saudi - groomed and trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, both countries being breeding grounds for terrorists. OBL got thrown out of Saudi Arabia for trying to set up camp there and Afghanistan and Pakistan welcomed him. I just saw a report that the Bali bomber (who is Indonesian) was found not far from where OBL was living, and the arrested 25 people suspicion of being terrorists. WOW Pakistan, you are really on the ball now!!!!
This list was updated May 1, 2011, which is a list of domestic, trans-national and extremist terrorist (total of 47) groups in Pakistan.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries ... p_list.htmHere's something else from the same website.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries ... index.htmlVarious shades of radical political Islam colour, indeed define, the Pakistani identity and nation, even as the country is positioned at the heart of contemporary Islamist terrorism. Extremist Islam is, and has long been, the state’s principal tool of internal political mobilisation and of external projection in an extraordinary and audacious enterprise of strategic overextension. Crucially, the footprint of almost every major act of international Islamist terrorism, for some time before 9/11 and continuously thereafter, invariably passes through Pakistan. After 9/11, the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, and the stark choice given to the Pakistani leadership, the dynamics of the Islamist terrorist enterprise in South Asia have undergone dramatic adaptive adjustments and modifications. Essentially, however, this dynamic, its underlying ideologies, and its motivational and institutional structures, remain intact.
There is strong and cumulative evidence that the Pakistani power elite, located in the regressive military-mullah-feudal combine, is yet to abandon terrorism as a tactical and strategic tool to secure what it perceives as the country’s quest for ‘strategic depth’ in the region. This remains the case despite the increasing ‘blowback’ of Islamist terrorist violence within the country, and the progressive erosion of the Army’s status and control in expanding areas of the country. While the Pakistani Army has taken selective action against particular groups of Islamist terrorists – particularly those who have turned against the state, who have attacked President Musharraf and senior Army and Government functionaries, who have engaged in sectarian terrorism within the country, or who are targeted specifically on behalf of, and under pressure from, the US –
it is the case that Pakistan continues to support and encourage the activities of a wide range of terrorist and Islamist extremist organisations. This is particularly the case with organisations that are active in Afghanistan – including remnants of the Taliban – and in India. Despite cosmetic policy changes and some tokenism – including formal bans on a number of terrorist organisations – many prominent Islamist terrorist organisations continue to operate with a high measure of freedom in and from Pakistan.