the message board for Dubai English speaking community
Flying Dutchman wrote:Was Syria discussed at the latest Durban UN racism conference? I am trying to find references.
In Europe we would call you fella's fundamentally 'radicalized'
event horizon wrote:Flying Dutchman wrote:Was Syria discussed at the latest Durban UN racism conference? I am trying to find references.
Of course it was. Just like Muslims condemned operation Anfal or currently speak out against Syria's racist laws.
Perhaps if you ask politely, shafique will be nice enough to provide us with all the evidence.....
RobbyG wrote:Say Shaffy, I think he's ignoring me...
Say Shaffy, I think he's ignoring me...
event horizon wrote:Flying Dutchman wrote:Was Syria discussed at the latest Durban UN racism conference? I am trying to find references.
Of course it was. Just like Muslims condemned operation Anfal or currently speak out against Syria's racist laws.
Perhaps if you ask politely, shafique will be nice enough to provide us with all the evidence.....
Was Syria discussed at the latest Durban UN racism conference? I am trying to find references.
On the Middle East, the Conference called for the end of violence and the swift resumption of peace negotiations; respect for international human rights and humanitarian law; and respect for the principle of self-determination and the end of all suffering, thus allowing Israel and the Palestinians to resume the peace process, and to develop and prosper in security and freedom.
Expressing concern about the plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation, the Conference, in its Declaration, recognized the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state. It also recognized the right to security for all States in the region, including Israel, and called upon all States to support the peace process and bring it to an early conclusion.
Analytic Summary
Kurds in Turkey comprise approximately one-fifth of the population, although it is difficult to measure their exact numbers due to undercounting in Turkey's census, substantial assimilation within western Turkey and Turkey's long standing policy of "Turkification," which denied the very existence of a distinct Kurdish ethnicity until 1991 (e.g., Mustafa Ataturk referred to Kurds as "mountain Turks"). For this reason estimates have ranged from 10 percent to 24 percent of Turkey's population. The majority of Kurds reside in the mountainous southeast of the nation, but a great many Kurds who have renounced public expressions of their culture have been assimilated into mainstream Turkish society and live in Istanbul and its surrounding suburbs (GROUPCON = 2; GC119 = 3).
The Kurds in Turkey are predominantly Sunni Muslim, though most follow a different school (the Shafi school) than the Sunni Turkish majority, which follows the Hanafi school (BELIEF = 0; RELIGS1 = 5). The Kurds speak primarily Kurdish -- in particular, the Kirmanci and Zara dialects -- though some Kurds also speak Turkish (LANG = 1). Their social customs differ significantly from Turks, who have progressively become more secular (CUSTOM = 1). The rural Kurds in the southeast depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods, and some are still semi-nomadic; however, this region receives much less governmental aid and investment of much of the region's surplus capital. An earthquake in May 2003 primarily affected the southeastern region.
Any discussion of discrimination of Kurds in Turkey must be qualified, because if a Kurd renounces his culture, all forms of social progress are open to him. Yet unassimilated Kurds face a great deal of cultural, economic and political discrimination in Turkey (ECDIS06 = 2; POLDIS06 = 4). For example, authorities often censor pro-Kurdish newspapers, particularly in the southeast Kurdish region. In some towns, local authorities prohibited Kurdish New Year celebrations and arrested scores of persons for participating in the celebrations. The government continued to arrest and torture Kurdish activists and leaders (REPNVIOL04-05 = 4; REPNVIOL06 = 3). Kurds face restrictions on speaking, publishing, and instructing in their native language (CULPO206 = 2) as well as forming organizations that promote Kurdish culture. For example, since 2001, authorities closed the Mesopotamia Cultural Center, established to promote Kurdish language and culture, and the Kurdish Institute, another cultural institution. However, the climate for Kurds has slightly improved, particularly in 2003, since the country's leaders began pushing for admittance into the European Union by meeting democratization goals. For example, in 2002, parliament passed laws allowing parents to give their children Kurdish names. In some cases, classes on the Kurdish language are allowed now, and Kurdish broadcasters may set up their own television station. While the Turkish government lifted emergency rule in the southeastern part of the country in 2003, it still maintains armed paramilitaries -- often called "village guards" -- in predominantly Kurdish areas. These troops continue to prevent Kurdish villagers, who were forcibly displaced by security forces during the conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, from returning to their villages in the southeast. According to Human Rights Watch, the paramilitaries have killed at least 18 Kurdish civilians between 2004 and 2006 (REPGENCIV04-06 = 5). The military also frequently clashed with armed members of the Kurdish Worker's Party (REPVIOL04-06 = 5). Overall, though, while some expansion in some political and cultural rights has occurred, restrictions in public policy keep Kurds as second-class citizens.
The political life of Kurds is an especially interesting case, because as aforementioned, open displays of "Kurdishness" are restricted, if not prohibited in many cases. This has not stopped certain Kurds from attempting to end Turkish policies conventionally however (GOJPA06 = 4). The People's Labor Party (HEP) was founded in 1990 when 10 pro-Kurdish members of parliament broke off from the Social Democrats, Turkey's main opposition party. In 1993 the HEP was outlawed for being pro-Kurdish and its members founded the Democratic Party (DEP), which was outlawed in 1994 when its members formed the People's Democracy Party (HADEP). This party was not officially Kurdish, but in practice its members attended Kurdish rallies (PROT02-03 = 3) and often yelled out Kurdish slogans in Parliament. It faced sizable restrictions, and its pro-democratization campaign was viewed with suspicion by the government because of the pro-Kurdish undercurrent of the party. Though the government closed HADEP in 2003, Kurdish protest levels have remained high in recent years (PROT04-06 = 4).
HADEP was believed, although it denied, to have had ties to the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), a militant organization comprised of approximately 10,000 troops that have been engaged in large-scale guerrilla activity in the southeast from 1984 to 2000 (REB99-00 = 6), seeking an independent Kurdistan and union with Kurds living in Iraq, Iran and Syria. The PKK has taken advantage of the no-fly zone instituted in northern Iraq since the end of the Gulf War by conducting cross-border raids and at times, the Turkish military has pursued these militiamen into Iraq. In 1999, the PKK's founder, Abdullah Ocalan was arrested in Kenya and is currently the sole inmate in an island prison off Istanbul. Initially sentenced to the death penalty, Ocalan's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, commiserate with Turkey's new parliamentary abolition of the death penalty in the hopes of getting into the European Union. After Ocalan's arrest, PKK demands have focused mainly on gaining more political rights rather than Kurdish independence. Most of the PKK fighters have withdrawn to Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq (at the urging of Ocalan from prison), so guerilla activity has decreased to a small-scale and intermediate guerilla resistance in recent years (REB01-03 = 4; REB04-06 =5).
Analytic Summary
The Kurdish people make up about 10 percent of the population of Syria, with 40 percent living in the northeastern sections of Jazeera governorate in northern Syria (GROUPCON = 1). Some Kurds have started moving into the larger cities to seek employment, but many still live in the mountainous north-east. The main distinctions between the Kurdish people and the majority Sunni Muslims in Syria are language, cultural beliefs and holidays (CUSTOM = 1; LANG = 1). They share the same religious beliefs and are of no different racial stock or noticeable racial difference than the majority Sunni-Arabs. (BELIEF = 0; RACE = 0).
Within Syria, Kurds are disadvantaged in many ways. Successive governments have pursued forced Arabization policies. A majority of Kurdish people are considered non-citizens or some lower level form of citizen. They do not receive equal education, health services, right to organization or the right to equal legal protection (POLDIS06 = 4). Also, they have lower levels of income and face societal discrimination in access to lands, jobs and higher education (ECDIS06 = 4).
Throughout the 1980s there was a system of forced resettlement by the government and competition for land. During the 1990s, the forced resettlement tapered off but the competition and disposition of their lands remains an issue. Between 1995 and 1999, the Kurdish area of Syria experienced a drought, causing some demographic stress. The drought exacerbated the steady, low-level migration to urban areas and external migration.
Kurdish grievances include equal legal protection under the Syrian constitution, better education and economic opportunities and the cessation of Arabization policies. This would allow them to speak their language and practice their cultural customs. Like Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, there is also some support for an autonomous region (POLGR06 = 3; ECGR06 = 1; CULGR06 = 1).
The Kurdish people within Syria are not highly organization because of the mountainous region they live in and because Kurdish political parties are banned in Syria. Fifteen Kurdish political organizations do exist covertly.(GOJPA0406-3). Kurds in Syria have not suffered from intracommunal conflict in recent years.
The Syrian government’s policies of Arabization and oppression of the Kurdish people are still in place. In 2004, fighting between fans of rival football teams escalated into ethnic riots in Qamishli, resulting in the deaths of more than 30 people and hundreds more injured (CCGROUPSEV104 = 5). In 2005, following the abduction and murder of a prominent Kurdish cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Mashuq al-Khaznawi, protests erupted and turned violent when local Arabs attacked protesters and Kurdish shops (CCGROUPSEV205 = 5). Protests took place in each year from 2004 to 2006 (PROT04-06 = 3), centered on government treatment of Kurds, on the Qamishli riots and on the death of al-Khaznawi. Government repression of civilians occurred in 2004 with the torture and arrests of innocent civilians in wake of Qamishli riots (REPGENCIV04 = 4). In 2004 and 2005 non-violent Kurdish protesters were killed by Syrian government forces, and in 2006 Kurds celebrating the Kurdish New Year were arrested (REPNVIOL0405 = 5; REPNVIOL06 = 3). Kurdish rioters were killed in 2004 and arrested in 2005 (REPVIOL04 = 5; REPVIOL05 = 3).
event horizon wrote:Any articles on the Kurds written by Muslims?
I give you evidence of Kurds being killed by Turks and instead of condemning these injustices, you ask for evidence that Muslims condemned these actions. Where's the evidence that you and your fellow fanbois spoke out against the Turkish actions? Certainly it's lacking in this thread.