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New lessons from the Six-Day War / Documents show complex history before first shot

June 11, 2006​|​By Sandy Tolan

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's unilateral "Convergence" plan, which would permanently fix Israel's borders without negotiations with the Palestinians, is a direct result of a war that ended 39 years ago this weekend. The Six-Day War redrew the map, and the politics, of the Middle East. Waves of Jewish settlers would move to the West Bank, while generations of young Palestinians would arise to resist the occupation, spawning two uprisings and endless bloodshed on both sides.

On June 11, 1967, the entire world woke up to a radically new Middle East.





It was Day Seven, the day after the six days of war. Israelis, who only a week earlier were terrified of annihilation from the armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, had not only survived; their soldiers were occupying the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Syria's Golan Heights, and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.

Arabs had suffered the most humiliating defeat in their history, and suddenly hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Egyptians and Syrians found themselves living under occupation. It was a victory so stunning and so complete as to leave even Israelis in shock.

At the time, most observers thought the occupation would be short-lived, and that eventually Israeli withdrawal would form the basis for a "two-state solution" and an end to the conflict. Few foresaw that the occupation would last four decades, leading to Olmert's unilateral "solution" that many analysts predict will only prolong the conflict.

Stunning as it was to many observers, the result of those cataclysmic 144 hours nearly four decades ago surprised few military and intelligence analysts. Documents from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, reveal a history far more complex than the traditional narrative of the powerful Arabs aligned against a fragile Israel. On the contrary, as the smoke cleared on June 11, the outcome confirmed what these analysts already knew: The Arab armies were far from some fearsome juggernaut, and Israel would easily prevail.

The war had begun six days earlier, at 7:45 a.m. on June 5, when French-built Israeli bombers roared out of their bases and crossed into Egyptian airspace, en route to a surprise attack that would leave Gamel Abdel-Nasser's air force in smoking ruins. Within hours, similar strikes would demolish Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi air forces. With Israeli pilots suddenly patrolling Middle Eastern skies virtually unchallenged, the Six-Day War was essentially decided in six hours.

Thirty-nine years later, the traditional explanation for Israel's surprise attack -- that the Jewish state was threatened by 100,000 Egyptian troops poised along the border of the Sinai Peninsula, and had to attack Nasser's forces or be destroyed -- withers under historical scrutiny. For years Israeli and some American commentators have insisted that tiny Israel, in a hostile Arab sea, acted purely in self-defense against forces intent on annihilating it. Yet declassified documents from the era, especially those of the Johnson library, reveal a far more complex reality.

In 1967, many Arabs wanted war. Nineteen years earlier, more than 700,000 Palestinians had fled or been driven from their homes in the first Arab-Israeli war -- known to Israel as the War of Independence, but to Palestinians as the Nakba, or Catastrophe. In Nasser, much of the Arab world saw a "pan-Arab" liberator. Palestinians believed they would realize their "right of return" to their old homes and fields on the backs of Nasser's army.

Despite such demands, and the anger of the Syrians who accused Israel of stealing its precious water resources, the Egyptian president nevertheless resisted calls for war. In June 1965, for example, he asked the Palestine National Council, "If we are today not ready for defense, how can we talk about an offensive?"

In some respects, the Egyptian president's words and actions were bellicose, especially for a Jewish state whose devastated psyche was grounded in the Holocaust. Yet in the months leading to June 5, Israel had done its own provoking. The previous November, it had launched a huge raid against Palestinian guerrilla suspects in the West Bank village of Samu, blowing up dozens of houses and killing 21 Jordanian soldiers.

In a memo to President Johnson, Walt Rostow, head of the National Security Council, declared that the raid "was all out of proportion to the provocation" and had "undercut Hussein," Jordan's king, who the United States was bankrolling with "$500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing factor." In April 1967, following an exchange of gunfire with Syria in the demilitarized zones of the Golan Heights, the Israelis shot down six Syrian Soviet-built MiGs; one Israeli fighter -- in a display of public humiliation for the Syrians and their ally Nasser -- roared over Damascus in victory.

These events helped escalate the rhetoric of threat on both sides. Yitzhak Rabin, then chief of staff of the Israeli army, threatened to destroy the Syrian regime, and Nasser responded in kind. As pressure built from Syria and the Palestinians, and even from King Hussein, who was under pressure at home for being a "lackey" for the West, Nasser declared, "We are ready!" On May 22, responding to taunts from Jordan, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The Israelis considered this an act of war.

Despite these moves, in 1967 the Egyptian president repeatedly demonstrated a strong aversion to war -- a fact ignored in the traditional David vs. Goliath re-telling of Middle Eastern history. Again and again, Nasser told Western and Soviet diplomats he had no intention of attacking Israel, and intelligence reports from May 1967 support this.

Multiple U.S. and British spy agencies indicated the Israeli numbers of 100,000 Egyptian troops were highly inflated. The CIA, in a May 22 memorandum, declared Egyptian troop strength at 50,000 men, and characterized Nasser's Sinai forces as "defensive in character." Rostow called the Israeli estimates "highly disturbing," and the CIA concluded that they were part of a "political gambit intended to influence the U.S." Israel, according to this CIA assessment, wanted the United States to pressure Nasser into ending his blockade of the Straits of Tiran, or alternately, for the Americans to send more military hardware to Israel or allow Israel to take matters into its own hands.

President Johnson, for a time, cautioned Israel not to attack. On May 26, when the visiting Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, told of an "apocalyptic" atmosphere in Israel, LBJ assured him that American military experts had concluded the Egyptians would not attack, and that if they did, "you will whip the hell out of them." That same day, however, Israel sent urgent word to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, indicating imminent attack from Egypt and Syria. "Our intelligence," Rusk reiterated, "does not confirm this Israeli estimate."

During this time, Nasser was reiterating to Westerners his reluctance to engage Israel -- despite his heated rhetoric for the Arab masses. On May 31 in Cairo, he told former American Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson, a longtime acquaintance, that he would not "begin any fight." The two men discussed the possibility of a visit to Cairo by Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and laid the groundwork for a secret visit to Washington by Egyptian Vice President Zakariya Moheiddine. On June 2, Nasser told the British MP, Christopher Mayhew, that Egypt had "no intention of attacking Israel."

The Soviets, meanwhile, continued to urge Nasser away from war; at one point, the Soviet ambassador to Cairo made a personal visit to Nasser's residence at 3 a.m., underscoring Moscow's concern.

By early June, however, Israel had become convinced that war was inevitable. Following a cabinet shakeup, Meir Amit, the Mossad (Israeli spy agency) director, embarked on another trip to Washington, where he would recall telling Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that "I, Meir Amit, am going to recommend that our government strike." According to Amit, McNamara, preoccupied with Vietnam, asked him how long a war would last. "Seven days," the Mossad director responded.

The Americans concurred: Nasser's forces were too weak, and the Arab armies too disorganized, to prevail against a powerful Israel. As U.S. undersecretary of state Nicholas Katzenbach would recall, "The intelligence was absolutely flat on the fact that the Israelis...could mop up the Arabs in no time at all."

If Israel was not so vulnerable in 1967, why, then, its surprise attack on June 5? Many Arab historians argue that the Six-Day War was a war of expansion, a deliberate conquest of land in the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai and the Golan. Other historians suggest this was the war that no one wanted, but which became inevitable nonetheless. The "apocalyptic" atmosphere described by Abba Eban -- for a population branded by the Holocaust barely 20 years earlier -- is recalled by any Israeli who lived through those days.

For the Arabs, the desire to avenge the defeat of 1948, and make Nasser the champion of the entire Arab world, perhaps in the end carried the Egyptian president beyond reason: Indeed, Lucius Battle, the former American ambassador in Cairo, suggested that Nasser had "gone slightly insane," and had begun to believe in his own rhetoric. In this view, brinksmanship on both sides pushed the hostile forces beyond the point of no return, and into a reluctant war.

Yet as the first Israeli jet crossed the Sinai air space on the morning of June 5, Nasser was engaged in efforts to avoid war. After Nasser's Cairo meeting with Robert Anderson, American and Egyptian officials secretly arranged a meeting with Vice President Moheiddine for June 7. Moheiddine was to be spirited away from a "routine" meeting at the U.N., to talk with Johnson and other White House officials in Washington. Learning of the meeting, Rostow wrote LBJ that Rusk should inform the Israelis, since "my guess is that their intelligence will pick it up."

Whatever the Israelis learned, the meeting with Moheiddine never took place. By the time of the scheduled meeting, it was already day three of the Six-Day War. The Israelis had captured Sinai, Gaza and the West Bank, and Arab forces were beating a humiliating retreat.

Sandy Tolan is director of the Project for International Reporting at the Graduate School of Journalism at the UC Berkeley. This is adapted from his book, "The Lemon Tree: An Arab, A Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East." Contact us at ​insight@sfchronicle.com​.





I think I see where the crux lies. Egypts intention was light defensive in the front Sinai region. Read below.

On the eve of the war, Egypt massed approximately 100,000 of its 160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all of its seven divisions (four infantry, two armored and one mechanized), as well as four independent infantry and four independent armored brigades. No less than a third of them were veterans of Egypt's intervention into the Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists. These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs and more than 1,000 artillery pieces.[120] At the same time some Egyptian troops (15,000 - 20,000) were still fighting in Yemen.[121][122][123][124]

Nasser's ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his orders to the military. The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, each change requiring the redeployment of troops, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles. Towards the end of May, Nasser finally forbade the general staff from proceeding with the Qahir ("Victory") plan, which called for a light infantry screen in the forward fortifications with the bulk of the forces held back to conduct a massive counterattack against the main Israeli advance when identified, and ordered a forward defense of the Sinai.[125] In the meantime, he continued to take actions intended to increase the level of mobilization of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in order to bring pressure on Israel.

So Egypts strength was 'exhausted' and basically unprepared for war. If you then consider the hybrid attack that Israel implemented, which was an excellent strategy to gain air superiority over Egypt, then it becomes clear that Israel indeed was stronger in bringing strategy to practice, while the numbers clearly show that Israel was outnumbered.

The Israelis employed a mixed attack strategy: bombing and strafing runs against the planes themselves, and tarmac-shredding penetration bombs dropped on the runways that rendered them unusable, leaving any undamaged planes unable to take off and therefore helpless targets for later Israeli waves. The attack was more successful than expected, catching the Egyptians by surprise and destroying virtually all of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground, with few Israeli casualties.
Over 300 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed and 100 Egyptian pilots were killed.[141] Among the Egyptian planes lost were all 30 Tu-16 bombers, as well as 27 out of 40 Il-28 bombers, 12 Su-7 fighter-bombers, over 90 MiG-21s, 20 MiG-19s, 25 MiG-17 fighters and around 32 assorted transport planes and helicopters. The Israelis lost 19 planes, mostly operational losses (mechanical failure, accidents, etc). The attack guaranteed Israeli air superiority for the rest of the war.

The article says the 100,000 figure for Egyptian troops in Sinai was an Israeli figure and was inflated.

And Mossad telling the US that the war wiould be over in days - BEFORE the war says it all.

But that said, the attack against the Egyptians was decisive and brilliant - it's just that the spin now seems exposed.

Cheers
Shafique

shafique wrote:The article says the 100,000 figure for Egyptian troops in Sinai was an Israeli figure and was inflated.

And Mossad telling the US that the war wiould be over in days - BEFORE the war says it all.

But that said, the attack against the Egyptians was decisive and brilliant - it's just that the spin now seems exposed.

Cheers
Shafique

With 'outnumbered' I meant the total Arab forces (not just Egypts army) vs. Israel which EH showed in the other topic.

Just to clarify.

Ok - understood.

Now we'll wait for FD and eh to read what the US docs said about the expectations of Israel and the US assessment before the war (despite being outnumbered). I wonder whether they will agree that the official reason 'whithers away' on closer inspection.

Shafique

shafique wrote:Ok - understood.

Now we'll wait for FD and eh to read what the US docs said about the expectations of Israel and the US assessment before the war (despite being outnumbered). I wonder whether they will agree that the official reason 'whithers away' on closer inspection.

Shafique

I have no idea what official reason you believe I quoted you're referring to (perhaps you're confused again, no surprise). I quoted the facts regarding the armaments of the Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli militaries - the Arab armies were more than just 'larger' - which, in a modern battlefield, will often account for little.

The Arab armies were better equipped than the Israeli forces, with the Israelis using outdated vehicles and planes from the second war era, ie., Israel had an arsenal of Sherman tanks and WWII French troop transports but the Egyptians and Syrians were armed with modern Soviet tanks.

Both Arab governments also had better combat aircraft than the Israelis. Israel simply leveled the playing field, as RG pointed out, by preventing Egyptians from using their planes. In addition to strategy, the Israelis had better trained officers and soldiers than the Arabs. According to one military historian that I read, Israeli tank officers were in the front of an engagement with the other tanks and their crews, whereas the Arab officers were in the rear.

This obviously meant that Israeli officers were more likely to suffer casualties but, at the same time, this strategy payed off in the form of decisive wins against Arab armor divisions. The facts show that the Egyptians and Syrians were, on paper, more powerful militarily, but the Israelis came out victorious for reasons that were not due to possessing the latest and best armaments.

The number of Egyptians in the Sinai is a moot point - and quite a bit of spin when told without considering other facts. The Egyptians had a massive population compared to Israel and Israel would be fighting on several fronts. The Israelis successfully decapitated Egypt's military, which apparently prevented the Egyptians from mobilizing their soldiers and attacking Israel with weapon systems not only matching what the Israelis had, but were clearly superior.

Eh - I suggest you read the article before you embarrass yourself further. The US docs confirm the point I made that the Israelis expected an easy victory before they started the war.

I said we should contrast the official spin with the facts as now revealed - and as the author above says, the myth you presented 'whithers away'.

I never said Israel had more men or armaments - only that their internal assessment correctly showed they had superior military force - heck Mossad told the yanks it would only take 7 days, and they beat that expectation.

I trust you'll address the evidence and won't start constructing strawmen or fantasise about whether I am corpulent and vertically challenged

Cheers
Shafique

*yawn*

First Egypt. I believe Nasser didn´t want war, but became a captive of his own words. To understand Egypts action, the relationship between Nasser and Amr is crucial. Amr did want war for his own glory. He had serious plans to cut Israel is half by invading the Negev. Lets not forget that Egypt disposed of the UN in the Sinai, engaged in very provocative sorties over Dimona, and conducted some hositilies from Gaza. When Israel attacked Egypt, it used almost all of his air force, leaving the rest of Israel undefended. A huge risk! But it worked. Victory was not so certain. Israel never expected to concur the whole of the Sinai and certainly not that it would have been so easy. They wanted to give some initial blows to the Egyptians, but didn't expect them to run for their lives after the first bullets were fired. One of the reason the Israeli air attack was so succesfull, is that Amr that day flew from Jordan to Egypt, and ordered the Egyptian airforce to stay on the ground for his safety. The war against Egypt was defensive, in order to prevent an Egyptian invasion ordered by Amr into to Israeli Negev.
Jordan and Syria are a no-brainer really, they started shelling and bombing Israeli civilian areas, Israel just couldn't sit still.

I said we should contrast the official spin with the facts as now revealed - and as the author above says, the myth you presented 'whithers away'.

What is this 'official spin' that you're referring to?

Is that a power word?

I never said Israel had more men or armaments

Actually, you said that the Israelis forces were superior to the Egyptians and Syrians.

Besides dropping phrases like 'withering away' and 'official spin', I haven't seen much of anything that addresses the actual armaments of the Israelis and the Arabs.

Until you do so, I'll go ahead and save my time by shrugging off opinion pieces from whatever rag you find on the net. Maybe I'll just copy/paste the Israeli side to waste some time. Who knows?

only that their internal assessment correctly showed they had superior military force

Ok - why don't you compare the armaments of the Egyptians and the Syrians with the Israelis.

Then we can see who is actually embarrassing themselves.

'Whithering away' is used by the author in the article. As I said you should read the article and comment on what it says, and check whether it confirms my statements that Israel believed it's forces were superior before they launched the war.

The article also addresses whether it was Nasser was forced into a war by his military or whether it was a land grab by Israel who spurned peace initiatives.

The myth that is 'withering' away is clearly spelled out in the article.

Cheers
Shafique

Flying Dutchman wrote:First Egypt. I believe Nasser didn´t want war, but became a captive of his own words. To understand Egypts action, the relationship between Nasser and Amr is crucial. Amr did want war for his own glory. He had serious plans to cut Israel is half by invading the Negev. Lets not forget that Egypt disposed of the UN in the Sinai, engaged in very provocative sorties over Dimona, and conducted some hositilies from Gaza. When Israel attacked Egypt, it used almost all of his air force, leaving the rest of Israel undefended. A huge risk! But it worked. Victory was not so certain. Israel never expected to concur the whole of the Sinai and certainly not that it would have been so easy. They wanted to give some initial blows to the Egyptians, but didn't expect them to run for their lives after the first bullets were fired. One of the reason the Israeli air attack was so succesfull, is that Amr that day flew from Jordan to Egypt, and ordered the Egyptian airforce to stay on the ground for his safety. The war against Egypt was defensive, in order to prevent an Egyptian invasion ordered by Amr into to Israeli Negev.
Jordan and Syria are a no-brainer really, they started shelling and bombing Israeli civilian areas, Israel just couldn't sit still.

It's amazing that the rag shafique quoted did not mention that Egypt was doing its own saber rattling by sending in 'terror squads' into the Sinai and helping out Gazan terrorists.

Oh wait, what's amazing is that shafique actually wants us to address the rag he copy/pastes.

shafique wrote:'Whithering away' is used by the author in the article. As I said you should read the article and comment on what it says, and check whether it confirms my statements that Israel believed it's forces were superior before they launched the war.

The article also addresses whether it was Nasser was forced into a war by his military or whether it was a land grab by Israel who spurned peace initiatives.

The myth that is 'withering' away is clearly spelled out in the article.

Cheers
Shafique

I did read the article. I'm waiting for you to stop embarrassing yourself and address the actual facts (beyond dropping power words), rather than resorting to posting some rag that contains half-truths and serious omissions.

So, and be honest, which is superior - a sherman or a T-62.

Lol, I quoted the whole article and chose not to selectively quote.

So, do you now agree that the Israelis believed they had a superior military that could win the war in 7 days - before they started the war?

Cheers
Shafique

Good for you - I didn't say that you selectively quoted the article (please quote me where I said this). Please try to read.

I definitely did say that your article contains quite a bit of spin - such as half-truths and serious omissions.

In any event - feel free to address the actual facts. Which nation had better armaments, Israel or Egypt and Syria?

So, do you now agree that the Israelis believed they had a superior military that could win the war in 7 days - before they started the war?

Sure, some said this to the Americans. Errr, I think one guy said this. But other Israelis thought they would lose several thousand soldiers in the conflict - which wouldn't exactly be the cake walk that your spin would have us to believe.

LoL.

Introduction

This estimate of Israelis and Arab military capabilities was prepared just prior to the Six day war on May 26, 1967 by the United Stated Central Intelligence Agency, National Board of Estimates.

An alternative estimate or a censored version of this one was apparently prepared on the same day. That estimate has sometimes been cited as "proof" that Israel was not in any danger and that the US and Israel knew this to be the case. Between 50,000 (US estimate) and 100,000 (Israeli estimate) Egyptian troops had been moved into Sinai by May 25. The US estimate of five divisions, given below, would be consistent with a force of about 75,000. Israeli intelligence warnings on the same day as this estimate was delivered, had warned of an imminent Egyptian attack, while the US repeated cautioned Israel not to initiate a pre-emptive strike. Israel had dug 10,000 graves and prepared about 14,000 hospital beds for casualties in preparation for the war.

The report makes the following interesting estimate:

Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the UAR struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Regrouping and resupplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period.

Had Israel had lost half its air force, regrouping and resupply would have been possible only if there were not serious loss of pilots, since it would be impossible to retrain pilots in this period. Airport runways would not be serviceable and there would be no way to service the aircraft and refuel them. Presumably, during this period, Israeli cities and strategic installations, including the Dimona nuclear reactor, would be open to Egyptian attack and Israel would have little effective air defense capability. As the Egyptians would probably have bombed Israeli ports and Lod Airport, resupply would have been difficult. In the event they had hit the nuclear reactor, the strike might have spread a great deal of radiation, in which case there might have been little point to resupply.

In the event, Israel struck first. However there is no way of knowing for certain what would have been the result if the Egyptians had struck first.

A far different estimate was delivered by the CIA's national board of estimates on the same day, stating that Israel had lost this round by failing to attack, and would suffer heavy losses if it attacked now, and what is critical, that Israel would not undertake the war without adequate assurance of resupply:

5. The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply.

The U.S. chose to believe and act on the first estimate, apparently because it was intent on restraining Israel from attacking first regardless of possible costs to Israel. The important part of this estimate, in the cynical calculus of the US, was apparently the conclusion that Israel would not attack as long it was not assured of resupply. Therefore, the US may have believed they could be reasonably assured that Israel would not and could not attack without a positive "green light" from the United States.

http://www.zionism-israel.com/hdoc/CIA_ ... tional.htm

Funny, it amazes me how much more spin I can uncover from the rag you copy/pasted.

Avoiding the fact that Mossad told the yanks the war would be over in 7 days.

I'm not surprised the zionist website tries to excuse or spin the exagerated numbers - but as -I never disputed that Egypt had more troops, this is a classic strawman. What I said was that Israel believed the war would be a walkover because their miltiary was superior.

Avoiding the evidence in the article speaks voiumes.

Shafique

So now a vague quote what a Mossad director allegedly said against the American government is conclusive proof? Allrighty.

Israel certainly didn't believe it was far superior to the Arab forces. It was highly outnumbered (in material and soldiers). It did believe it had a moral advantage. The IDF was better organized, had better intelligence and was better motivated. Chain of command in the IDF is very short, resulting in soldiers that have to think for themselves and take responsibility. This is one of the reasons the Golan was conquered. Moshe Dayan went renegade and ordered the attack on the Golan, against the wishes of then PM Eshkol (thats right Eshkol didnot want the Golan). The amount of Israeli casualties estimated were huge. In the end it appeared a walk-over against the expections of the Israeli's.
Another main advantage (as mentioned by event horizon) is that Israeli officers lead their troops into battle, contrary to Arab officer who stay in their bunkers. Resulting in high officer casualties, but also highly motivated troops.
Israel begged Jordan to stay out of the war. When Jordan attacked, Israel retaliated, hardly a surprise. Again, Israel was very surprised by the weakness of Jordan troops. The main goal was Jerusalem. Soon Jordanian troops ran across the river. Who can blame Israel for taking the whole of the Westbank because it was practically deserted by the Jordanian army?
Yes, the Israeli cabinet and army leaders were completely in shock by the stunning victory. The believed they could prevent Arab armies invading Israel by giving them some blows, but the end results were expected by noone. Israel expected to be able to beat the Egyptians in Gaza and after that maybe El-Arish, but not to take the whole Sinai.

I agree with the other historian from your opinion piece:

Other historians suggest this was the war that no one wanted, but which became inevitable nonetheless.

Nobody could predict the sequence of events. What would have happened when Jordan and Syria attacked Israel when the IAF attacked Egypt? Israel would be a goner. Not a sure victory at all.

Ok, now I'm at a real computer for a little while - let me quote the relevant bits of the article which make the point I was making before about the difference between the 'spin' and reality - notably the central myth that Israel was fighting a defensive war against an aggressive Arab enemy:

shafique wrote:New lessons from the Six-Day War / Documents show complex history before first shot
...
Documents from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, reveal a history far more complex than the traditional narrative of the powerful Arabs aligned against a fragile Israel. On the contrary, as the smoke cleared on June 11, the outcome confirmed what these analysts already knew: The Arab armies were far from some fearsome juggernaut, and Israel would easily prevail.
..
Thirty-nine years later, the traditional explanation for Israel's surprise attack -- that the Jewish state was threatened by 100,000 Egyptian troops poised along the border of the Sinai Peninsula, and had to attack Nasser's forces or be destroyed -- withers under historical scrutiny.

...
Despite these moves, in 1967 the Egyptian president repeatedly demonstrated a strong aversion to war -- a fact ignored in the traditional David vs. Goliath re-telling of Middle Eastern history. Again and again, Nasser told Western and Soviet diplomats he had no intention of attacking Israel, and intelligence reports from May 1967 support this.

Multiple U.S. and British spy agencies indicated the Israeli numbers of 100,000 Egyptian troops were highly inflated. The CIA, in a May 22 memorandum, declared Egyptian troop strength at 50,000 men, and characterized Nasser's Sinai forces as "defensive in character." Rostow called the Israeli estimates "highly disturbing," and the CIA concluded that they were part of a "political gambit intended to influence the U.S."

..
By early June, however, Israel had become convinced that war was inevitable. Following a cabinet shakeup, Meir Amit, the Mossad (Israeli spy agency) director, embarked on another trip to Washington, where he would recall telling Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that "I, Meir Amit, am going to recommend that our government strike." According to Amit, McNamara, preoccupied with Vietnam, asked him how long a war would last. "Seven days," the Mossad director responded.

The Americans concurred: Nasser's forces were too weak, and the Arab armies too disorganized, to prevail against a powerful Israel. As U.S. undersecretary of state Nicholas Katzenbach would recall, "The intelligence was absolutely flat on the fact that the Israelis...could mop up the Arabs in no time at all."

Ergo, my statements before that Israel's spin and what these documents reveal expose a cynical attempt to disguise the real intentions - a land grab. In terms of Golan, it was a grand for water source as well.

The quote above from the CIA states that the spin of inflating Egyptian troop numbers was exactly an attempt at spin.

Cheers,
Shafique

LOLZ. Perhaps you can check CIA estimates about Vietnam/VC around that time.

Hey, I'm with you on the shortfalls in intelligence by the Langley boys - but the interesting thing is that there were multiple reports (including British intel) and the proof is in the outcome of the war.

I wasn't around in 67, so I am just going by the info declassified in 06.

CIA correctly identified the Israeli spin on troop strength but failed to realise or stop the -sraeli war crime against the Liberty (which was part of the stealing of Syrian land and water - violating an agreement with the US) with friends like Israel, no wonder states are wary of this nation who wages war and routinely lies about the reasons. It is a pattern that repeated itself when it bombed Gaza and blamed Hamas rockets for breaking a truce that in fact was broken by Israel on the US election day. The difference today is that the spin is uncovered pretty quickly, but there are still those who do continue to believe spin even in the face of evidence of lying.

event horizon wrote:

Introduction

This estimate of Israelis and Arab military capabilities was prepared just prior to the Six day war on May 26, 1967 by the United Stated Central Intelligence Agency, National Board of Estimates.

An alternative estimate or a censored version of this one was apparently prepared on the same day. That estimate has sometimes been cited as "proof" that Israel was not in any danger and that the US and Israel knew this to be the case.

I agree with EH on this one.

As I said before to Shafique, is that he lays to much 'good faith' into the memoires of high ranking figures that have implemented their story in the US national historic archives, as is the case in the document that Shafique showed earlier on.

I do agree with Shafique that the US/Israeli intelligence gathering about the Egypt troop movements was strong and accurate, which gave the Mossad a reason to start 'blitzkrieg' attack, just to use some German terms.

In reality, the 7 day prediction shuold be seen as nothing more than an opportunistic memoire made in hindsight. In reality, nobody can foresee the duration of a war based on the huge discrepancies in army strength between the Arab and Israeli forces. I see the historic records as no more than painting a strong image of US/Israel policy in the historic archives. Chomsky mentions this is his book. Memoires are not something that should receive much credibility.

Concluding that I fully agree with EH, and that Shafique has a very weak argument by holding on to conversations made from memoires as visible in US historic records.

Fair enough - perhaps I am putting too much weight on the highlighted bits in the article.



Cheers
Shafique

I think you do.

Glad we (partially) agree.